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Abstract 
Contracting out placement services aims at enhancing the effectiveness of placements of un-
employed job-seekers through market mechanisms. This paper analyses the effectiveness of 
the temporary assignment of needy job-seekers to private placement services by comparing 
their outcomes with respect to employment, unemployment and benefit receipt with those of 
a suitable control group. Using recently available administrative data we apply propensity 
score matching to construct the control group. We regard a period after a policy reform in 
2005 that introduced a new means-tested benefit, the unemployment benefit II, and empha-
sized the activation of needy unemployed people. Hard-to-place job-seekers usually need more 
effort to be placed into a job. Therefore it is an interesting question whether groups of people 
with different a priori employment probabilities benefit to a different extent from an assign-
ment to a private placement service. To answer this question we analyse several subgroups 
separated by sex, age, migration background, occupational education and time since the last 
job. Our results suggest that in some cases the assignment to private providers is relatively 
more effective for groups of job-seekers who are rather hard to place. Despite positive em-
ployment effects for some subgroups, however our results imply that the assignment to private 
providers is generally ineffective and in some subgroups counterproductive regarding the goal 
of avoiding unemployment and benefit receipt. 
 
JEL classification: C13, H43, J68 
 
Keywords: Propensity score matching, evaluation of active labour market policy, public em-
ployment service, private employment service, means-tested benefit recipients 
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1 Introduction 
New public management deals with the idea to introduce more market orientation to the pub-
lic sector to enhance the cost-efficiency and effectiveness. Placement services are traditionally 
organised by the public employment service. Some countries introduced market systems to 
organise placement services: For instance Australia has privatised all placement services by 
introducing the Job Network. The Netherlands and Great Britain assign certain groups of un-
employed to private placement services. Danes, Belgians as well as Germans use contracting 
out placement services as a complementary competitive element beside the public employ-
ment service (Bruttel 2005, Fay 1997, Konle-Seidl 2006). 
The evaluation literature on contracting out has developed several criteria to assess the per-
formance of tendering systems for example efficiency, effectiveness, quality, incentives and 
market structure (Bruttel 2005, Bartlett and Le Grand 1993, Struyven and Steurs 2005). This 
paper examines the effectiveness of contracting out placement services in Germany. This op-
tion became important for means-tested benefit recipients with the introduction of the Social 
Code II at the beginning of the year 2005: It established the new unemployment benefit II 
(UB II), and emphasised activation policies. 
We regard a sample of needy unemployed people who were temporarily assigned to private 
providers of placement services. Their employment outcomes are compared with those of a 
control group who received placement services by the public provider. The controls are selected 
from a sample of means-tested unemployment benefit recipients using propensity score 
matching. We are also interested in effect heterogeneity. Therefore we estimate treatment 
effects for different age-groups, with and without migration background, different skill-groups 
and different periods since the end of the last job. 
In Germany, the option of contracting out placement services was only established during the 
1990s. It has been extended recently: Until the year 1994 only the Federal Employment 
Agency was allowed to provide placement services. The legal framework for contracting out 
subtasks of placement was introduced in the year 1998 as § 37 of the Social Code III (Sozial-
gesetzbuch III, SGB III). Such subtasks are for example profiling and case management. In 2002 
a so-called placement voucher (§ 421 g SGB III) was introduced that was – under certain con-
ditions – delivered to the unemployed. The placement voucher guarantees a premium for an 
external provider in case of a successful placement. Moreover, contracting out all placement 
services with the only aim of immediate placement was introduced in 2002 (§ 37 SGB III). Ad-
ditionally, there was a very similar instrument called contracting out of reintegration services 
(§ 421 i SGB III) between 2003 and 2007. External providers were supposed to design and to 
put in tender innovative strategies to reintegrate unemployed. Thus there exist two quasi-
market options for involving external placement providers: contracting out and the placement 
voucher. 
Expenditures for contracting out of placement services for unemployment benefit II recipients 
amounted to 63 million Euro in 2005. Table 1 displays the inflow of means-tested unemploy-
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ment benefit recipients and other unemployed people into private placement services in recent 
years. It distinguishes between the different options of such services. For means-tested benefit 
recipients contracting out full placement services is the prevailing model with an inflow of 
nearly 160 thousand participants in 2005 and about half that number in 2006. The particularly 
large inflow in the year 2005 is presumably much related to the introduction of the new bene-
fit system. New local unemployment benefit II agencies were set up. In this first year after the 
benefit reform, these agencies had a considerable work-load with the implementation of new 
activation policies and were short of experienced case-managers. Hence, contracting out 
placement services was also used to reduce their workload.  
Table 1 
Stock of unemployed and number of assignments to private providers and honoured placement 
vouchers in thousand 
Year UB II 
recipients
Other 
Unem-
ployed
UB II 
recipients Other
UB II 
recipients Other
UB II 
recipients Other
UB II 
recipients Other
2004 0 4.374 0,0 395,9 0,0 239,4 0,0 19,3 0,0 54,0
2005 2.418 2.074 115,7 86,8 157,0 66,1 19,0 16,9 14,0 37,0
2006 2.448 1.655 67,0 83,3 81,5 69,7 12,7 21,4 28,0 35,0
Unemployment stock 
(annual average)
Source: Statistic Department of the Federal Employment Service in Germany, own calculations
Note: From 2005 onwards 69 districts in which only local authorities are in charge of administering the unemployment benefit II are 
excluded due to missing data.
Honoured placement 
vouchers
Contracting out 
subtasks of placement 
services
Contracting out full 
placement services
Contracting out of 
reintegration services
 
Means-tested benefit recipients make up for a considerable share of the assignments to pri-
vate placement services, even though in contrast to unemployment insurance benefit recipi-
ents do not have the right to demand such an assignment after six months of unemployment. 
Evaluation results for contracting out full placement services in Germany exist either for the 
period before the Social Code II came into force or without taking into account unemployment 
benefit II recipients. Winterhager (2006a) and Winterhager (2006b) estimate effects on regular 
employment, subsidised employment and unemployment for persons who have been assigned 
to private providers at the first quarter 2004 for every month up to nine months after the as-
signment. They use administrative micro data and matching techniques. They find on average 
negative short-term effects that are largest after two months and then diminish. Only women 
in West Germany, older people (Winterhager 2006a) and younger people (Winterhager 2006b) 
benefit from their assignment to private placement services with up to three percentage 
points higher employment chances.  
In a similar way WZB and infas (2006) approach the evaluation of private placement services. 
However, they quantify heterogeneous effects by sex, age, gender, region and unemployment 
duration for persons who have been assigned to private placement services between 2003 and 
2005. They only regard the treatment effect on unsubsidised employment at the fourth month 
after assignment. The only significant effect they find is a negative one for large cities with 
high unemployment rates. In summary the temporary assignment of job-seekers to private 
placement services does not seem to have increased their employment chances in comparison 
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to unemployed who had only been advised by the public employment service. Winterhager 
(2006a) explains the ineffectiveness with deficits in the contract management: Providers who 
combined low quality with low prices were awarded by accepting their offers.  
In comparison to both existing studies this paper considers more recently assigned persons and 
analyses a considerable longer period up to 24 months after assignment. Our paper is the first 
study that is concerned with the effectiveness of private placement services for means-tested 
benefit recipients. The new legal framework emphasises their activation. Therefore, it is a 
highly relevant policy question, whether private placement services considerably contribute to 
their integration into the labour market. In addition to the usual employment outcomes this 
paper takes the level of earnings in a job compared to the last job into account. Since the 
means-tested UB II is not an individual but rather a household based benefit the administra-
tive data of the Federal Employment Agency enable to identify partners. For this reason it is 
possible to account for the employment history of partners when estimating participation 
probabilities.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section two describes the institutional framework of the 
Social Code II and of private placement services. The econometric evaluation approach and the 
micro data that we rely on are discussed in section three. In section four we present the re-
sults on the average treatment effects on the treated for a large number of different treat-
ment groups. We summarize these results and draw a number of conclusions in the final sec-
tion five. 
2 Institutional Setting 
In 2005 after a job loss unemployed people received unemployment insurance (UI) benefit for 
6 to 32 months, depending on age and previous history in contributory employment.1 Provided 
that they pass the means-test and are capable of working, people who exhausted their UI 
benefit and people who have never worked or worked only for a short period of time in con-
tributory jobs receive the tax-financed unemployment benefit II. This benefit unified the for-
mer unemployment assistance and social benefit for employable needy people with the intro-
duction of the Social Code II in 2005.2 
                                               
1  The unemployment insurance (UI) benefit is earnings-related with a replacement rate of 67 percent 
for a parent and 60 percent for childless people. The UI benefit in contrast to UB II is time-limited, 
where the length of receipt increases with the time a recipient has contributed to unemployment in-
surance within a period of seven years prior to the benefit claim. The maximum duration of UI receipt 
though depends on age and was one year for those aged younger than 45 in the year 2005. It in-
creased for older age groups and those older than 56 years could even receive their UI benefit up to 
32 months. The maximum entitlement lengths of those older than 44 years were considerably re-
duced though in the year 2006; the maximum entitlement length is now 12 months except for un-
employed workers aged at least 55 years, for whom it is 18 months. 
2  People who can work under the usual conditions of the labour market for at least three hours a day 
are regarded as capable of working. Only due to an illness or disability it is possible not to fulfil this 
criterion (Article 8 Social Code II). 
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The Federal Employment Agency and local authorities are responsible for the support services 
for means-tested benefit recipients. For the first time a federal and a local institution have to 
cooperate on the local level. Over the course of the year 2005 both responsible bodies estab-
lished in most districts a consortium for advising means-tested benefit recipients (Arbeitsge-
meinschaft, ARGE).3  
One goal of the reform was to activate needy unemployed people including persons who have 
not been in contact with the Federal Employment Agency before, i.e., previous social benefit 
recipients or partners of previous unemployment assistance recipients. Active labour market 
programmes and social integrative schemes are supposed to support employable needy per-
sons. In 2005 contracting out placement services was one of the most important active labour 
market programmes for unemployment benefit II recipients: There were more than 270 thou-
sand assignments to these placement services. Programmes with more participants were a 
workfare programme in the public sector, the so-called One-Euro-Jobs (§ 16 (3) SGB II) with 
an inflow of more than 600 thousand people and short-term training programmes (§ 48 
SGB III) with an inflow of more than 400 thousand people.  
The effectiveness of contracting out placement services depends on several factors as labour 
market conditions, composition of participants, design of contract management and institu-
tional setting within public and external providers. Evaluation results only refer to the time 
and place and design of contract management one analyses. For instance there is no knowl-
edge of whether the public provider achieved improvements on placement services that result 
from the existence of competition with private providers. Although a general comparison of 
placement services by public or private providers is desirable, one can only find exemplary 
evidence.  
Private providers operate in contrast to the public provider in a competitive way and have 
specific incentives for successful placements. Taken together, at first sight one could expect 
that private providers perform better than the public provider with respect to the placement of 
the target groups. Struyven (2004) identifies three basic principles to distinguish contracting 
out from providing placement services by the public employment service only. These principles 
help to explain the aspiration for more effectiveness of placement services if external providers 
are involved: 1) the split between principal and provider, 2) competition and 3) management 
based on results.  
1) Placement services are traditionally offered by the public employment service only. Though 
in recent years placement services by private organisations have been allowed. The public sec-
tor organises the access of private providers as a purchaser or principal. A multi actor system 
replaces the former single actor system. The multi actor system is not centrally organised. 
There are fewer hierarchical levels and multi actor systems may react in a more flexible way to 
the local context.  
                                               
3  In 69 administrative districts (Optionskommunen) only local authorities advise means-tested benefit 
recipients.  
IAB-Discussion Paper 5/2008 9 
2) Private organisations are expected to be more flexible and service-oriented than traditional 
public organisations. Competition through the market mechanism is supposed to ensure good-
quality services at the lowest possible costs. At the start of the year 2005 contracting out was 
organised competitively among those external providers who are proposed by the Federal Em-
ployment Service. We assume that providers who have performed poorly in the recent past 
have been excluded in the first place from this limited competition. Moreover, providers had to 
achieve minimum local and factual standards as well as standards concerning their personal 
structure to take part in the tender. But finally quality aspects were irrelevant when choosing 
the winning bid. The bid with the lowest price won the tender just as in the year before.  
3) Management of contracting out refers more to results than to inputs or processes. The pub-
lic purchaser implements financial incentives to induce high placement rates. There was al-
ways an incentive payment in case of a successful placement for the specific time period and 
group we will analyse. If during the assignment period the external provider places any unem-
ployed person into a regular contributory job that lasts for at least three months, he receives 
half of the incentive payment. The remaining second half is paid, provided that a client re-
mains in that job for six months. The median (potential) incentive payment for the treated in 
our sample is 1,160 Euro. Apart from an incentive payment, expense allowances, which are not 
performance-related, are paid per assigned job-seeker. But in contrast to incentive payments, 
expense allowances are not always part of the contract between public and private providers. 
The expense allowance is relevant for about two thirds of assigned job-seekers in our sample 
(Table 2). 
Whether private providers perform better than the public ones also depends on the placement 
services of the public provider at the same time, since the comparison group are needy unem-
ployed people who receive such services from the public employment service. We regard a time 
period at the start of the year 2005 when the unemployment benefit II agencies just started 
working after a reorganization of the means-tested benefit system. A survey shows that only 
half of the consortiums had been able to work on a regular basis up to April 2005 (WZB, infas 
2006). Processing of applications for unemployment benefit II had been the first priority 
among other duties such as setting up the new case management and placement services as 
well as contract negotiations between local and federal authorities and the establishment of 
personnel and organisational structures (Trube 2006). This is another reason for expecting the 
private placement services to be more effective than the public provider. 
Bartlett and Le Grand (1993) define creaming as discrimination against more expensive hard-
to-place clients. Incentive payments for every person per standardised target group and exter-
nal provider amounted to the same value. For this reason it is rational for external providers to 
minimise their effort by placing clients with high chances of finding contributory jobs. Instru-
ments to prevent external providers from creaming are expense allowances in conjunction 
with the definition of minimum service standards, homogeneous groups or different incentive 
payments according to employment probabilities (Struyven 2004). In 2005 standardised target 
groups in the tender consisted first of all of people searching vocational training. Other stan-
dardised target groups were job-seekers differentiated by specific lengths of their unemploy-
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ment spells. Private providers offered a price per standardised target group. This price was not 
only the basis for choosing the winning bid. It fixed the amount of the incentive payment. If 
an expense allowance was intended in the standardised tender the price fixed the amount of 
this allowance as well. Remuneration and contracts with private providers are fixed before job 
seekers are assigned to private providers. Therefore, it is interesting to look at the distribution 
of potential incentive payments and expense allowances by characteristics of assigned job-
seekers. 
Table 2 
Median previously arranged incentive payment per assigned job-seeker in Euro and share of as-
signed job-seekers for whom an additional expense allowance is paid, contracting out full place-
ment services for UB II recipients, inflow from February to April 2005 (potential treatment group) 
Total Total
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Total 1,160 980 977 1,200 1,200 66.4 70.4 70.7 57.7 64.1
Age
< 25 years 998 864 864 1,368 1,260 57.0 55.1 53.9 61.3 62.5
25-34 years 1,160 1,090 1,000 1,200 1,160 70.3 71.9 74.0 66.2 67.4
35-49 years 1,150 980 980 1,200 1,160 68.4 78.6 78.0 50.7 60.7
50-57 years 1,264 1,264 1,264 1,624 1,200 75.9 86.8 85.0 58.6 72.6
Migration background
with 1,160 1,180 1,200 1,160 1,160 81.2 94.8 97.1 63.0 71.1
without 1,133 966 944 1,200 1,200 63.5 66.2 66.8 56.4 62.6
Occupational qualification
with 1,090 950 937 1,200 1,200 59.7 63.3 63.4 50.8 58.2
without 1,170 1,160 1,135 1,200 1,160 75.9 81.4 83.8 66.0 70.4
Age>=30 years, 
last unsubsidised employment in
2004 1,160 1,000 1,000 1,200 1,160 53.3 72.9 77.8 53.3 67.5
2003 or 2002 1,160 980 979 1,200 1,160 54.6 82.4 78.9 59.7 63.7
before 2002 or never 1,180 1,180 1,135 1,400 1,160 57.6 82.5 80.1 51.6 62.8
Source: IEB V 5.01 and data mart from the Statistic Department of the Federal Employment Agency, own calculations
Note: Data refer to 11,291 UB II recipients in our potential treatment group who have been assigned to private placement services between February 
and April 2005. (Other sample restrictions are described in the chapter on data.) 20 % potential treatments have missing values on incentive payment 
and expense allowance.
East Germany West Germany
Median previously arranged incentive payment 
per assigned job seeker
share of job seekers for whom an expense 
allowance is paid (%)
East Germany West Germany
 
The incentive payment should be the higher the lower the a priori employment prospects of 
the job seeker to account for the higher effort that is necessary to integrate job-seekers who 
are hard to place like migrants, the elderly, unskilled or persons who have not been employed 
for a long time. If the incentive payment does not compensate for the higher effort the effec-
tiveness of the assignment to private providers may be affected for hard to place job-seekers. 
In this way placement vouchers were less effective for long-term unemployed than for other 
unemployed even though the second part of the incentive payment amounted up to 1,000 
Euro more for long-term unemployed than for other unemployed (Winterhager, Heinze and 
Spermann 2006). However, the median potential incentive payments were not always higher 
for hard to place job seekers when contracting out placement services: i.e. the median poten-
tial incentive payment for men in West Germany amounted to 1,200 Euro independent of their 
occupational qualification (Table 2). Even if the median potential incentive payment for hard 
to place job seekers was higher than for job seekers with better job prospects the difference is 
relatively small: i.e. the median potential incentive payment for women with migration back-
ground in East Germany was 1,200 Euro and for those without migration background 944 
Euro.  
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Given the higher effort that is needed to integrate hard to place clients the public provider 
pays more frequently an expense allowance for such clients than for others (Table 2). The value 
of the allowance is about 7.5 or 12.5 percent of the potential incentive payment. If there are 
no additional requests on placement activities and monitoring, creaming may not be prevented 
by paying expense allowances. Therefore, expense allowances only decrease the risk of the 
private provider and increase his incentive to take part in the tender. 
Financial incentives may induce higher efforts for hard to place clients and may weaken dis-
crimination for more expensive clients. Because of the payment structure of contracting out 
placement services creaming tendencies may occur. But creaming in the sense of concentrat-
ing placement effort on clients who are relatively easy to place may also characterise the 
placement strategy of public providers. Thus, it is an interesting empirical question to what 
extent private providers integrate hard-to-place clients to the labour market more effectively 
than the public ones. For this reason we analyse the effectiveness of placement for several 
subgroups with different employment prospects.  
Private providers are interested in placing their clients in jobs that last at least half a year. The 
reason is that they get the second half of their incentive payment only if the client is in a job 
after this period. But private placement services do not benefit if their clients achieve high 
wage levels. Therefore, we expect the difference between assigned job-seekers and controls on 
the share of persons in unsubsidised jobs with at least eighty percent of earnings of the last 
job to be smaller than the pure employment effect without considering wage levels.  
3 Evaluation Approach and Data 
Evaluation Approach 
When evaluating the programme effects of private placement services, the problem of unob-
servable possible outcomes arises. This is the fundamental evaluation problem. The Roy (1951)-
Rubin (1974)-Model gives a standard framework of this problem. The model and the matching 
method which under certain assumptions resolves the evaluation problem are discussed in 
many recent papers, e.g. Caliendo and Kopeinig (2006) or Sianesi (2004). The main pillars in 
the model are first individuals, second the treatment, and third potential outcomes. 
Every individual can potentially be in two states (treatment/no treatment) each with a possibly 
different outcome. As no individual can be observed in both of these two states at the same 
time, there is always a non-observed state, which is called the counterfactual. 
Let D be an indicator for treatment, which takes the value one if a person is treated and zero 
otherwise. The treatment effect ATTτ  for a treated individual would be the difference of his 
outcome with treatment ( )1(iY ) and without the treatment ( )0(iY ):  
]1)0([]1)1([]1)0()1([ =−===−= iiiiiiiATT DYEDYEDYYEτ
    (1) 
The outcome of an individual can never be observed in the treatment and the non-treatment 
state at the same time, so that the causal effect in equation (1) one is unobservable. This iden-
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tification problem needs to be resolved. Under certain assumptions a comparison of the out-
comes of treatment group members with very similar control members identify the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT).4 
Propensity Score Matching is one approach to identify such effects. We follow the discussion 
of the approach by Becker and Ichino (2002): Let us define the propensity score according to 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) as the conditional probability of treatment where iX  is a vector 
of observables at values prior to treatment. 
 ]1[]1[)( iiiii XDEXDPXP ====        (2) 
In this context some conditions have to hold for identifying the treatment effect: the condi-
tion of balancing of pre-treatment variables given the propensity score ( )(XPXD ⊥ ). Ac-
cording to this condition observations with the same propensity score have the same distribu-
tion of observables; given pre-treatment characteristics, treatment is random and treatments 
and control units do on average not differ with respect to pre-treatment characteristics.  Next, 
there are the conditions of unconfoundedness ( XDYY |)0(),1( ⊥ ) and of unconfounded-
ness given the propensity score ( )(|)0(),1( XPDYY ⊥ ). Unconfoundedness is also labelled 
as the conditional independence assumption (CIA) and states that outcomes in case of treat-
ment and non-treatment are independent from actual assignment to treatment given the 
propensity score. 
If treatment is random within cells defined by the vector X , it is also random within such cells 
defined by the values of propensity score )(XP , which in contrast to X  has only one dimen-
sion. Given the above conditions, we have 
{ }
{ }1|)](,0|)0([)](,1|)1([
)](,1|)0()1([
]1|)0()1([
==−==
=−=
=−=
iiiiiii
iiii
iiiATT
DXPDYEXPDYEE
XPDYYEE
DYYEτ
 .   (3) 
The basic idea of the matching estimator is to substitute the unobservable expected outcome 
without treatment of the treated ]1|)0([ =ii DYE  by an observable expected outcome of a 
suitable control group )](,0|)0([ iii XPDYE =  that has the same distribution of the propen-
sity score as the treatment group. To implement a matching estimator, it requires the addi-
tional assumption of common support 
1)|1(0 <=< XDP ,          (4) 
                                               
4  The decision on which effect to estimate depends on the research question. Heckman, LaLonde and 
Smith (1999) discuss further parameters. 
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since for individuals whose probability of treatment is either 0 or 1, no counterfactual can be 
found. Finally, the "stable unit treatment value assumption" (SUTVA) has to be made. It states 
that the individual's potential outcome only depends on his own participation and not on the 
treatment status of other individuals. It implies that there are neither general equilibrium nor 
cross-person effects.  
We estimate the ATTs at different points in time after programme start (t=0):  
}1|)](,0|)0([{)](,1|)1([ 0,0,0,,0,0,,, ==−== iiitiiititATT DXPDYEEXPDYEτ     (5) 
As propensity score matching estimators we use nearest neighbour and radius matching im-
posing common support. Both techniques select for each treatment observation one or more 
comparison individuals from a potential control group. The following equation defines these 
estimators5 
∑ ∑
∈ ∈



⋅−=
treatedi controlsj
jiji
treated
ATT YwYN
)0()1(1τ ,     (6) 
where treatedN  is the number of treated persons. ijw  is a weight defined as 
controlsi
ij N
w
,
1
=  ,           (7) 
where controlsiN ,  represents the number of controls matched to the ith treated person. With 
nearest neighbour matching, this number is chosen by the researcher: e.g., for each treated 
individual from the control group five neighbours are chosen whose propensity score differs 
less from that of the treated individual than those of all other control group members. In case 
of radius matching, all control group individuals are chosen whose propensity score does not 
differ in absolute terms from the one of the treatment individual by more than a given dis-
tance. In that case the number of matched controls may differ for each treated individual. For 
the analytical variances and hence the standard errors of these estimators see Becker and 
Ichino (2002). When carrying out the analysis we followed the outline from Caliendo and 
Kopeinig (2006). 
Data 
We use rich administrative data of the Federal Employment Agency for the empirical analysis. 
The Integrated Employment Biographies6 (IEB, Version 5.1 and 6.0) contain socio-demographic 
characteristics and individual daily information about employment history, benefit receipt, job 
search history and participation on several programmes of active labour market policy. Addi-
tional information about unemployment benefit II receipt and household structure are drawn 
from the history of means-tested benefits (LHG, Leistungshistorik Grundsicherung, Version 2.0 
                                               
5  For simplicity we leave away the subscript t for time after programme start. 
6  Jacobebbinghaus and Seth (2007) describe in detail a sample of the Integrated Employment Biogra-
phies. 
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and 3.0). The household information of the LHG can be used to merge individual IEB data with 
the partner’s IEB data. We account not only for the individual employment history but for the 
partner’s employment history as well when estimating the propensity scores. 
The potential treatment group consists of all persons who were registered as unemployed and 
received unemployment benefit II on 31 January 2005 and whose assignment to a private 
placement service started between February and April 2005. Data on treatments in the 69 
districts, in which only local authorities are in charge of administering the unemployment 
benefit II, are not available for the period under consideration. Hence, these districts are ex-
cluded from our sample. The potential control group consists of a 20 percent random sample 
of the stock of unemployed unemployment benefit II recipients on 31 January 2005. Control 
persons did not start an assignment to private providers between February and April 2005, but 
they could have started an assignment later on. Treatment and control group members could 
have been assigned to other active labour market programmes. Both, treatment and control 
group are restricted to persons who got unemployment benefit II, were not older than 57 
years, did not participate in any active labour market programme and did not have missing 
data in basic socio-demographic characteristics like age, sex, occupational qualification, mi-
gration background and East or West Germany on 31 January 2005.  
The propensity scores are estimated with probit models. We account for individual heterogene-
ity by estimating the propensity scores and matching the control group members within sev-
eral main groups and subgroups. The four main groups are men and women in East and in 
West Germany. These groups are divided into subgroups by age (15-24, 25-34, 35-49, 50-57 
years), occupational qualification (with, without), migration background (with, without) and – 
only for people who are at least 30 years old – time since the end of the last job (last job in 
2004, 2002 or 2003, before). The realised sample sizes are displayed in Figure 1 to Figure 4 
(Appendix).7 We use the following covariates to estimate the propensity scores: 
− Individual socio-demographic characteristics (age; migration background; health restric-
tions; qualification), 
− Characteristics of the needy household (single/partner; children; qualification of the part-
ner), 
− Individual labour market history (duration of employment, unemployment and not observ-
able states like out of labour force; participation in active labour market programmes; re-
ceipt of unemployment assistance in December 2004; characteristics of the last job like 
real earnings, full-/part-time, duration since its end), 
− Labour market history of the partner (duration of employment, unemployment and not 
observable states like out of labour force; participation in active labour market pro-
grammes), 
                                               
7  The sample sizes of different subgroups, e.g. all age-groups, need not sum up to the total sample size. 
The reason is that we used subgroup specific equations of the propensity score, with covariate sets 
that differ somewhat over various specifications. Specifications that use covariates which are partly 
missing for the sample lose some observations and vice versa. 
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− Local labour market (unemployment rate, share of long-term unemployed among the un-
employed, ratio between the stock of vacancies the stock of unemployed in January 2005 
as well as the percentage change of these three indicators against the previous year; type 
of district according to a classification of Rüb and Werner, 2007), 
− Interaction effects (individual labour market history and age; partner’s labour market his-
tory and age). 
We estimate for every subgroup up to six different probit models. We start with the maximum 
number of covariates and select sets of variables that enter the next estimation. A set of co-
variates is kept, if the Wald-Test on the hypothesis that their parameters are jointly zero 
achieves a p-value that is smaller than 0.5. This threshold value is stepwise decreased to 0.1 
for the following probit models. The propensity scores are computed with the resulting reduced 
group specific models. They always contain individual socio-demographic characteristics inde-
pendent on the previous test procedures. In Table 3 (Appendix) we display the coefficients of 
the probit models of the broad samples of men and women in East and West Germany. Results 
for the smaller subgroups that we consider are available on request. We do not discuss the 
probit results on the selection into the programme; a detailed analysis on this topic for a simi-
lar sample is discussed in Bernhard, Wolff and Jozwiak (2006). 
We assess treatment effects for five outcome variables that are available for different time 
periods. We defined all outcomes as success criterions since positive average treatment effects 
will indicate a positive impact of assignment to private providers and vice versa (number of 
months since assignment for which they are available in square brackets): 
− unsubsidised employment that is subject to social insurance contribution [20],  
− every unsubsidised employment including minor employment [20], 
− unsubsidised employment that is subject to social insurance contribution with at least 80 
percent of the last real wage (If somebody has never been employed he achieves this out-
come with every contributory employment independent from his last wage. People who 
have ever been employed only achieve this outcome criterion if they earn at least 80 per-
cent of their last real wage.) [8], 
− not registered unemployed and not participating at any active labour market programme 
[20], 
− no unemployment benefit II receipt [24]. 
The outcome variables stem from different micro data sets: For the outcome unsubsidised 
contributory employment and unsubsidised contributory or minor employment we combined 
two data sources: The data mart of the Statistics Department of the Federal Employment 
Agency and the IEB. The data mart provides information on contributory employment and mi-
nor employment of our sample members at the beginning of calendar months until May 2007.8 
We used these data, since the IEB 6.0 provides such information only until December 2005. 
However, the IEB 6.0 has quite recent information on active labour market policy participation 
                                               
8  However, the most recent employment data is still to some extent incomplete. 
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and hence subsidised employment until December 2006. We combined these two pieces of 
information to classify whether individuals at the first day of a calendar month held an unsub-
sidised contributory job or minor job. In turn we could compute the related outcome variables 
for up to 20 months after programme start. Moreover, from the IEB information on contribu-
tory jobs we could also compute, whether the contributory unsubsidised jobs of our sample 
members achieve at least 80 percent of the last (real) wage. Though this information could 
only be computed for up to eight months after assignment. 
Two other outcome variables were considered which do not focus on employment: Whether 
people are not registered as unemployed nor participating in any active labour market pro-
gramme and whether they do not receive unemployment benefit II. The first of these two out-
comes stems from the IEB 6.0 and is available for up to 20 months after assignment. The sec-
ond outcome came from the new data set on the history of means-tested benefits (LHG, Ver-
sion 3.0), which provides information for up to 24 months after assignment. These two out-
comes were computed for every first day of a calendar month since assignment as well. 
To estimate the average treatment effects on the treated for different points in time since 
programme start, it is necessary to assign potential start dates to the control group. The hypo-
thetical start month of each control group member is a random draw of the observed distribu-
tion of programme start months of the treatment group. When computing the random pro-
gramme start, we do not distinguish between different distributions within the subgroups. 
We execute six different matching algorithms to check for sensitivity of the estimated ATTs. To 
enhance the quality of the control group we generate a group specific caliper for some match-
ing algorithms: It is the 90th percentile of the distribution of the difference between the pro-
pensity scores of treatment and control group members that result from one-to-one nearest 
neighbour matching with replacement. Using this 90th percentile as a caliper eliminates the 
worst 10 per cent potential controls. We execute the following matching algorithms: 
− one-to-one nearest neighbour matching without replacement and group specific caliper, 
− one-to-one nearest neighbour matching with replacement, 
− one-to-one nearest neighbour matching with replacement and group specific caliper, 
− one-to-five nearest neighbour matching with replacement, 
− one-to-five nearest neighbour matching with replacement and group specific caliper, 
− radius matching with caliper 0.001, 
− radius matching with group specific caliper. 
Average treatment effects computed with different matching algorithms hardly differ from 
each other: The confidence intervals of the average treatment effects computed by a radius 
matching with caliper 0.001 comprise most of the estimated effects by the other matching 
algorithms. We only present results from radius matching with caliper 0.001, because it pro-
duces on average the best control group with the smallest standardised bias (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin 1985). Figures 1 to 4 (Appendix) show the mean standardised bias before and after 
matching for every subgroup. The remaining bias after matching never rises above 2.7 percent. 
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Moreover t-tests show that the hypothesis on equality of means off the covariates can not be 
rejected after matching as displayed by Table 4 to Table 7 (Appendix).9 Hence, we achieved a 
very good balancing. 
We also carried out another sensitivity analysis to shed some light on the issue how sensitive 
the estimated treatment effects are to violations of the unconfoundedness assumption. If 
there are unobserved variables affecting assignment to private providers and the outcome 
variable simultaneously, a so-called hidden bias could exist. With the help of a Rosenbaum 
bounds analysis, we can determine how strongly an unobserved variable must influence the 
assignment process to undermine the implications of the matching analysis. It shows how 
strong neglected unobserved factors have to change the odds ratio, so that our results overes-
timate the treatment effect. 
We applied the Mantel-Haentzel statistic using the STATA ado-file “mhbounds” by Becker and 
Caliendo (2007) and calculated the test statistic for the outcomes in every month after as-
signment for every subgroup that we considered. We only report here bounds for men and 
women in East and West Germany for the outcome unsubsidised contributory employment in 
the 20th month. We report the bounds for the nearest neighbour matching with one neighbour 
and without replacement, as the mhbounds command can be applied for this matching algo-
rithm (Becker and Caliendo, 2007). 
The effects of treatment on the employment outcome for East Germans were anyway not sta-
tistically significant applying this method. But for West Germans they were well-determined 
and positive. Nevertheless, already with unobservable influences that change the odds ratio of 
treatment by a factor of 1.06 for men and 1.14 for women in East Germany the ATTs would no 
longer be well-determined.  
4 Results 
The estimated ATTs for the three outcomes unsubsidised contributory employment, no unem-
ployment benefit II receipt and neither registered as unemployed nor participating in active 
labour market policy are presented in Figures 1 to 4 (Appendix) for men and women in East 
and West Germany. The figures plot the ATTs against the months since programme start. The 
t-statistics were computed using analytical standard errors. 
For the broad samples of men and women in East and West Germany every first graph in Fig-
ure 1 to 4 (Appendix) shows considerable and well-determined locking-in effects during the 
first four months after assignment: Job-seekers who have been recently assigned to private 
placement services have lower chances to be in unsubsidised contributory employment than 
the control group. But the difference in employment rates is never more than four percentage 
                                               
9  We display these statistics on match quality with respect to single covariates for the four broad sam-
ples of men and women in East and West Germany only. For the samples that distinguish further by 
age, migration background, occupational qualification and time since last job such statistics are 
available on request. 
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points. A potential reason for the locking-in effect is that private placement providers in a first 
step have to get to know their new clients and find suitable jobs that are likely to last six 
months at least in order to receive the whole incentive payment. In contrast the public provid-
ers already know their clients and do not need to place them into this specific type of jobs. 
Five months after assignment the locking-in effects disappear and clients of private placement 
services are more likely to be employed in an unsubsidised contributory job than the control 
group: The differences in employment rates tend to be slightly higher for West German clients 
of private placement providers as opposed to East German ones and only for West Germans 
they are nearly always well-determined. Compared with the matched controls 20 months after 
assignment employment rates are two to four percentage points higher for clients who have 
been assigned to a private provider (Table 8).  
Table 8 
Average treatment effects on the treated (percentage points) on unsubsidised contributory employ-
ment, radius matching with caliper 0.001 
Total sample 0,4 2,3 *** 0,3 2,1 *** 0,8 2,3 *** 1,8 ** 3,8 ***
Age
15-24 1,9 4,8 *** 0,2 3,1 * -2,0 2,3 4,2 * 2,5
25-34 -1,2 1,8 -0,5 0,0 0,6 2,3 2,5 5,5 **
35-49 -0,3 0,7 -0,5 1,3 2,1 ** 1,6 -1,2 2,8 *
50-57 -1,8 * -0,8 -2,2 *** -1,0 -0,6 1,9 4,0 * 4,0 *
Nationality
Germans 0,6 2,7 *** 0,2 1,7 ** 0,3 1,9 ** 1,7 * 3,9 ***
Foreigners/migrants 0,1 2,0 0,6 4,6 ** 3,7 ** 5,2 *** 3,2 4,2 *
Occupational qualification 
No qualification 0,1 3,4 *** 0,1 4,3 *** 0,7 1,6 1,8 3,3 **
qualification 0,6 1,8 * 0,5 0,9 1,0 3,1 *** 1,3 3,9 **
Age >= 30 and last regular job in
2004 -2,4 -0,9 -4,1 *** -0,6 0,9 1,2 -3,3 * 2,1
2002 to 2003 1,2 0,2 2,4 5,7 ** 2,2 * 2,1 3,4 * 5,2 **
Before 2002 or never -1,0 ** 0,7 0,9 0,9 1,8 ** 2,5 ** 1,6 3,3 **
Level of significance 0.01***/0.05**/0.10* based on analytical standard errors
East Germany West Germany
Men Women Men Women
6th month 20th month 6th month 20th month 6th month 20th month 6th month 20th month
after programme start after programme start after programme start after programme start
Source: IEB V5.01 and V6.01, LHG V2.0 and V3.0, data marts of the Statistics Department of the Federal Employment Agency, own calculations
Note: Unemployment benefit II recipients, treated assigned to private placement services between February and April 2005
 
These effects seem to be higher, if we regard the employment rate of assigned persons relative 
to the employment rate of the matched controls, instead of just regarding absolute differences 
in employment rates. The employment rate of the matched controls is in East Germany about 
18 percent for men and 14 percent for women and in West Germany roughly 24 percent for 
men and 21 percent for women 20 months after programme start (Table 9). Thus, at this point 
in time treatment raised the employment rates of the treated by about ten to nineteen per-
cent. 
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Table 9 
Regular employment rate of the matched controls (percent) 
Total sample 9,7 18,5 8,1 14,2 13,7 23,8 13,0 20,6
Age
15-24 12,5 25,4 12,9 21,2 21,9 36,2 19,9 30,9
25-34 11,9 21,7 9,5 16,4 17,9 30,6 14,2 22,0
35-49 7,9 14,3 6,6 11,4 11,1 19,8 11,9 19,7
50-57 5,6 9,4 4,2 7,1 5,6 8,8 5,8 8,0
Nationality
Germans 9,4 18,5 8,7 14,9 13,0 23,4 13,5 21,6
Foreigners/migrants 10,1 16,5 4,5 10,0 15,4 24,5 10,4 16,2
Occupational qualification 
No qualification 8,0 14,2 6,1 10,1 12,5 21,1 10,1 15,0
qualification 10,7 21,0 9,2 16,4 15,0 26,4 16,3 26,5
Age >= 30 and last regular job in
2004 17,4 26,3 13,0 18,7 19,7 29,9 19,0 26,5
2002 to 2003 7,3 15,0 6,6 13,0 9,7 19,8 9,7 18,4
Before 2002 or never 2,4 6,8 1,8 5,7 3,2 7,6 3,2 6,8
East Germany West Germany
Men Women Men Women
6th month 20th month 6th month 20th month 6th month 20th month 6th month 20th month
after programme start after programme start after programme start after programme start
Note: Unemployment benefit II recipients, results form radius-caliper matching with caliper 0.001
Source: IEB V5.01 and V6.01, LHG V2.0 and V3.0, data marts of the Statistics Department of the Federal Employment Agency, own calculations
 
We also estimated treatment effects for two alternative employment outcomes. These results 
are available on request: The first of them does not only count unsubsidised contributory as a 
success but also minor employment. Minor employment reduces dependency on benefits as 
well and is an option that is much easier to achieve for hard to place job-seekers. The esti-
mated ATTs for this outcome differ little from the ones for unsubsidised contributory employ-
ment only because for our analysed sample private providers got the incentive payment if their 
clients started a contributory job only. From 2006 onwards standardised tenders for unem-
ployment benefit II recipients always grant placements to minor employment with a reduced 
incentive payment. It will be interesting to know whether this had an impact on the effective-
ness of assignment to private placement services. 
The second alternative employment outcome is unsubsidised contributory employment with a 
wage level of at least eighty percent of the previous wage. However, this outcome is currently 
only available up to eight months after programme start, so that mostly locking-in effects are 
observed. Though the effects differ little from the ones for unsubsidised contributory employ-
ment, they tend to be somewhat weaker, the negative ones as well as the positive ones. That is 
to say private providers may tend to be more effective on placing job-seekers in unsubsidised 
contributory employment than on placing them in jobs with high wage levels simply because 
they do not benefit if their clients achieve high wage levels. But this evidence is based on a 
very short observation window and small differences.  
For the four broad samples of men and women in East and West Germany we also find that 
assignment to private providers did not reduce the probability of being unemployed or partici-
pating in ALMP. For this outcome the locking-in effects in the first six months are considerably 
stronger than for the employment outcome: They range from about six to eleven percentage 
points below zero. This is because job-seekers who have been assigned to private providers 
remain registered unemployed during their assignment. Even though in the sixth and seventh 
month these effects become less strong, they remain significantly below zero (up to minus five 
IAB-Discussion Paper 5/2008 20 
percentage points). Apparently a larger share of clients of private providers than of the 
matched controls is still unemployed or in ALMPs. Moreover, the matched controls in contrast 
to clients of private providers may have found other ways than employment to end the unem-
ployment status: A general retreat from job search due to child rearing, transitions into full-
time education, self-employment and (early) retirement are some of the available options, 
which cannot be observed in the data. 
Similarly, our results imply that the assignment to private providers does not contribute avoid-
ing dependency on unemployment benefit II receipt. Also here we find a significant locking-in 
effect that converges sooner or later to zero. That means there is no difference between as-
signed persons and the control group with respect to ending the unemployment benefit II re-
ceipt. 
The assignment to private placement services may affect the labour market performance of 
distinct groups of needy job-seekers in different ways because hard to place job-seekers may 
need higher efforts to place them into a job. We considered the following age-cohorts: 15-25, 
25 to 34, 35 to 49 and 50 to 57 year olds. Moreover, we distinguished between assigned per-
sons with and without migration background as well as with and without an occupational 
qualification. For people aged at least 30 years, we also estimated effects for assigned persons 
who ended their last contributory employment in three different periods: 2004, 2002 and 
2003, and before 2002 or never employed.  
Table 9 displays the employment rates of the matched controls and demonstrates that the 
subgroups differ substantially in their employment prospects: 20 months after assignment they 
range from six (East German women, last employment before 2002 or never employed) up to 
more thirty-six percent (young men in West Germany). 
With respect to the outcome unsubsidised contributory employment we find some heteroge-
neous results for different age groups expect for West German men (Appendix Figures 1 to 4). 
For East Germans it is only the youngest age-group where effects are positive and consider-
able with an ATT of close to five percentage points 20 months after assignment even though 
for women the positive impact is well-determined only at a few points in time after assign-
ment. For West German women aged older than 50 years our results imply that the policy is 
effective; the employment effects are often close to five percentage points. This is remarkable, 
since according to our results for the matched controls their chances of being employed with-
out treatment would have been only eight percent 20 months after assignment. 
For young male and even more so for young female job-seekers we find much higher locking-
in effects than for the older age-groups and all other subgroups, when we regard the outcome 
of neither being registered unemployed nor taking part in ALMPs. This presumably reflects the 
fact that the below 25 year old control group more likely exits into non-observable states like 
full-time education or parental leave.  
People with migration background have lower employment probabilities for instance because 
of language problems or discrimination. Though for our sample this is not always true. Table 9 
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shows that for West German men it is actually the matched controls of the migrants and not 
of Germans without migration background that have the better re-employment perspectives. 
And private providers have been very effective in placing West German men with migration 
background in comparison to those without migration background: From the fourth month 
onwards after assignment clients of private providers with migration background have around 
five percentage points higher employment probabilities than controls, while for those without 
migration background employment chances are at most two percentage points higher. Also for 
females in the East it is rather the treated with than without migration background with the 
higher ATTs on the employment rates at the end of the observation window. 
Assignment of hard to place clients to private providers has not only been more effective for 
West German male migrants and East German female migrants but also for job-seekers with-
out occupational qualification. Private placement services have been more effective when it 
comes to integrating job-seekers without and not with an occupational qualification into the 
labour market (Appendix Figures 1 to 4). This holds for East Germans nearly at all points in 
time and sometimes also for West German women.  
The effectiveness of private placement services also varies somewhat over different periods in 
which the last job of their clients ended. Here we only regarded people aged at least 30 years 
because many younger job-seekers have never had a job at all due to vocational education. 
Job-seekers who have been employed in the year before their assignment (2004) did not bene-
fit. On the contrary significant negative effects temporarily occur on all three outcomes. Ap-
parently this group finds new jobs more effectively on their own or with the help of public 
providers respectively. (This does not hold for West German men.) Moreover, compared with 
women who were last employed in 2004 or before 2002 or never, women who lost their last 
regular job in the years 2002 or 2003 are characterised by high positive effects on employ-
ment rates: 20 months after assignment they reach even five to six percentage points. That is 
to say long-term unemployed job-seekers who have not been unemployed for more than three 
years seem to benefit most of the assignment to private placement services. 
Taken together, we often found that the policy effectively integrates some groups of job-
seekers into regular jobs and many belong to groups who are usually hard to place like people 
with migration background or without occupational qualifications or long unemployment du-
rations. In turn the unemployment benefit II agencies could improve the effectiveness of the 
private placement services by involving them more in the placement of such groups of people. 
Yet, very likely this is not an option for needy people with extremely low chances of finding a 
job. For this group other activation policies may have to come beforehand. Finally, despite 
positive employment effects for some subgroups our results imply that the assignment to pri-
vate providers is generally ineffective and in some subgroups counterproductive with respect 
to the goal of avoiding unemployment benefit II receipt. 
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5 Summary and Conclusions 
Our study was concerned with the effectiveness of private placement services for means-
tested unemployment benefit II recipients. The inflow of needy unemployed into private 
placement services during the period February to April 2005 are our treatment group. It was 
restricted to people who were already needy and unemployed by 31. January 2005. The poten-
tial control group comes from a 20 percent random sample of the needy unemployment stock 
at that date and who were not assigned to private placement services between February and 
April 2005. We estimated with matching techniques treatment effects on the treated for vari-
ous employment outcomes as well as an outcome “neither being registered as unemployed nor 
participating in ALMP” and “no unemployment benefit II receipt”.  
Our results for all outcomes point to locking-in effects of private placement services in the 
first four to five months after the start of treatment. This may be surprising, because the 
treated should be placed in jobs by the private placement providers and these providers in 
contrast to the public ones can concentrate on the job placement task. But it is only surprising 
at first sight: The private providers need to get to know their clients. Moreover they only re-
ceive the second half of the incentive payment if they place their clients into jobs that last for 
at least six months. For that latter reason they may be choosier with respect to the expected 
length of job offers than the unemployment benefit II agencies. 
After the locking-in effects disappeared we find some positive treatment effects on the 
treated during the next 15 months. They are nearly always significant for West German par-
ticipants but frequently insignificant for the East German ones. But 20 months after assign-
ment they are well-determined for all these groups: Our estimates imply that their employ-
ment rates are raised by about two percentage points for East German participants and West 
German male participants and nearly four percentage points for West German female partici-
pants. Yet for the outcome neither unemployed nor participating in ALMP and the outcome no 
unemployment benefit II receipt participation is not effective: the estimated ATTs are often 
near zero for these outcomes at the end of our observation window; for the West Germans 
and the first of these two outcomes they are even sometimes negative and significant. 
When we regard variation of the treatment effects for all outcomes and for specific subgroups 
that differ by age, migration background, occupational qualification or time since last unsub-
sidised contributory employment we find some effect heterogeneity. Our results suggest that 
in some cases the assignment to private providers is particularly effective for groups of job-
seekers who are rather hard to place. These are men with migration background in West Ger-
many, all East Germans without occupational qualification, East German men below 25 years, 
West German women about 49 years and all women who are at least 30 years old and had 
their last job two or three years before they have been assigned. For them the effects on the 
employment outcome are positive and well determined for a broader time period after the 
locking-in effects had diminished. Moreover during this period there is no well-determined 
negative impact on other outcome variables. That is to say employment prospects have be-
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come better for these groups due to the assignment to private providers and at the same time 
the probability to be unemployed or an unemployment benefit II recipient has not changed.10  
Why have these subgroups benefited more than others? Variation in the median amount of 
potential placement incentive payment may explain this fact only in one case: For East Ger-
mans with different occupational qualifications. The median potential incentive payment for 
this subgroup was 1,160 Euro for East German men with an occupational degree (1,135 Euro 
for women) and was therewith about 200 Euro higher than for East Germans with no occupa-
tional qualification (Table 2). But other subgroups for whom the assignment has been particu-
larly effective, have the same or lower median potential incentive payments than their coun-
terparts. Apparently the placement effort of public providers was characterised to some extent 
by creaming. It may be traced back to the fact that unemployment benefit II agencies have 
been established over the course of the year 2005.  
Employment probabilities for job-seekers who have been employed in the year before their 
assignment were adversely affected by treatment. Negative effects temporarily occur on all 
three outcomes. Apparently this group finds new jobs more effectively on their own. 
Our findings for the subgroups of needy unemployed differ also from former results of evalua-
tion studies that rather regarded all unemployed (Winterhager 2006a, Winterhager 2006b, 
WZB and infas 2006). As described in section one, these studies usually found that the private 
placement services are mostly ineffective: only few specific groups like West German women, 
younger and aged job-seekers benefit from the assignment. Since these studies and our study 
were carried out in different time periods and addressed different treatment groups, one can-
not easily interpret these differences. One reason for our more optimistic results may be that 
public placement services put less effort into placement for needy unemployed than for all 
unemployed people, since the needy unemployed are less often regarded as employable and 
are rather assigned to other programmes like One-Euro-Jobs, a workfare programme. Another 
reason may be that in the specific period after the introduction of the new Social Code II the 
workload of the unemployment benefit II agencies with other tasks than placement services 
was particularly high. A comparison of the effectiveness of the private placement services for 
unemployment benefit I and unemployment benefit II recipients at the same period of time 
could shed some more light on this issue. 
Further research should regard a longer time horizon after assignment, so that we can evalu-
ate whether the treatment effects are permanent. This was not yet possible with the very re-
cent data at hand. With future micro data, we will also regard whether private placement 
                                               
10  Employment prospects for West German women older than 49 years have become better and at the 
same time the probability to be unemployed or an unemployment benefit II recipient has increased 
due to the assignment. Even so this group benefited from the assignment because negative effects 
may only result from control group members who withdraw from the labour market due to retire-
ment or because the partner found a job. As a result of the assignment to private providers this group 
continues job search instead of dropping out of the labour force. 
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services are effectively integrating needy unemployed into jobs that are stable and we can 
evaluate effects on earnings over a more considerable period of time. Moreover, we will study 
whether contracting out only subtasks of placement is effective for the participants. Our micro 
evaluation study cannot demonstrate whether the policy leads to higher employment rates at 
a macro level. With regional panel data though the effects of private placement services on 
the employment rate or the matching function will be quantified, in order to fill this gap. 
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Appendix 
Table 3 
Probit estimates - probability of assignment to private placement services from February to April 
2005 for unemployment benefit II recipients registered as unemployed in January 2005 
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Age in years (reference: 15-24)
25-29 -0,442*** 0,071 -0,283*** 0,061 -0,325*** 0,042 -0,362*** 0,043
30-34 -0,426*** 0,071 -0,278*** 0,061 -0,401*** 0,043 -0,360*** 0,043
35-39 -0,491*** 0,071 -0,377*** 0,061 -0,423*** 0,042 -0,409*** 0,043
40-44 -0,530*** 0,071 -0,385*** 0,060 -0,510*** 0,042 -0,466*** 0,042
45-49 -0,557*** 0,072 -0,471*** 0,061 -0,371*** 0,041 -0,368*** 0,042
50-57 -0,651*** 0,072 -0,583*** 0,062 -0,590*** 0,043 -0,544*** 0,042
With migration background 0,232*** 0,024 0,150*** 0,028 -0,071*** 0,018 -0,093*** 0,024
Impairmant of health or disabled -0,126*** 0,023 -0,126*** 0,030 -0,140*** 0,021 -0,215*** 0,032
Education (reference: Secondary school, vocational education)
No secondary schooling degree and no vocational education -0,042 0,025 -0,045 0,032 -0,090*** 0,022 -0,081** 0,031
Secondary school, no vocational education -0,006 0,024 0,005 0,029 -0,051** 0,019 -0,056* 0,026
GCSE or A-level, no vocational education 0,046 0,030 -0,049 0,034 -0,110** 0,033 0,014 0,037
GCSE, vocational education -0,003 0,018 0,002 0,022 0,030 0,025 0,042 0,029
A-level, vocational training or college -0,059 0,036 -0,070 0,039 0,023 0,028 -0,052 0,038
Looking only for a part-time job 0,106*** 0,030
Household context (reference: no partner, no children )
Children, no child younger than six years 0,048 0,028 0,022 0,021 0,080** 0,027 -0,019 0,024
Children younger than six years 0,044 0,034 -0,072** 0,026 0,060 0,031 -0,150*** 0,032
Married or unmarried partner in household 0,037 0,028 0,047 0,025 0,132*** 0,025 0,064 0,035
Partner in houshold with vocational education -0,141*** 0,029 -0,128*** 0,029 -0,054 0,032
Partner participated in ALMP 01/2000-01/2005 -0,068* 0,029 -0,064 0,038
Partners more than 12 months out of labour force 01/2000-12/2004 -0,089* 0,040
Partners more than 12 months regular employed 01/2000-12/2005 -0,088* 0,035
Cumulated duration of unemployment 02/2004-01/2005 (reference: 1-3 months)
4-6 months 0,225*** 0,067 0,348*** 0,063 0,163*** 0,042
7-9 months 0,326*** 0,067 0,330*** 0,065 0,162*** 0,044
10-12 months 0,378*** 0,065 0,373*** 0,064 0,137** 0,043
Unemployment benefit recipient in 12/2004 0,059* 0,024 0,090*** 0,025 0,164*** 0,024 0,139*** 0,029
ALMP participation during 02/2000-01/2005 (reference: no ALMP)
Private employment subsidy 0,011 0,024 -0,045 0,031 0,031 0,068
Job creation scheme -0,017 0,017 0,044* 0,019 0,118* 0,051
Start-up subsidy -0,006 0,048 0,023 0,070 0,169 0,137
Practical short-term training -0,033 0,024 0,029 0,030 0,018 0,048
Classroom short-term training 0,127*** 0,015 0,109*** 0,017 0,099* 0,039
Further vocational training 0,002 0,017 -0,002 0,019 0,143** 0,045
Other ALMP -0,047* 0,021 -0,002 0,023 -0,158*** 0,048
Duration since end of last ALMP 01/2000-01/2005 (reference: 25 months and longer or no ALMP)
1-12 months 0,049 0,050 0,149** 0,046
13-24 months -0,089 0,062 0,024 0,081
Cumulated duration out of labour force 02/2004-01/2005 (reference: 0 months)
1-6 months -0,067** 0,022 -0,112*** 0,027 -0,134*** 0,020 -0,139*** 0,028
7-11 months -0,045 0,045 -0,141** 0,044 -0,127** 0,039 -0,103* 0,045
12 months -0,360*** 0,081 -0,350*** 0,061 -0,338*** 0,057 -0,290*** 0,053
Cumulated duration out of labour force 02/2000-01/2004 (reference: 0 months)
1-6 months -0,095*** 0,018 -0,099*** 0,018
7-12 months -0,055* 0,025 -0,101*** 0,025
13-18 months -0,083* 0,036 -0,091** 0,031
19-24 months -0,126** 0,039 -0,062 0,035
25-30 months -0,112* 0,047 -0,111* 0,044
31-36 months -0,143** 0,049 -0,104* 0,047
37-42 months -0,166** 0,052 -0,076 0,051
43-48 months -0,217*** 0,046 -0,133** 0,048
Time since end of last contributory job (reference: more than 48 months [14 years] or none contributory job)
1-12 months -0,006 0,025 -0,023 0,035
13-24 months 0,002 0,024 0,027 0,035
25-48 months 0,061** 0,021 0,056 0,034
49 months - 14 years 0,019 0,035
Last monthly real wage (reference: None contributory job for at least 14 years)
1-400 Euro 0,012 0,048
401-800 Euro -0,021 0,041
801-1200 Euro 0,078* 0,037
1201-1600 Euro 0,012 0,036
1601-2000 Euro 0,051 0,036
2001 Euro and more 0,062 0,036
missing in real wage -0,091 0,050
Cumulated duration of minor employment 01/2000-12/2004 (reference: 0 months)
1-12 months -0,028 0,017
13-24 months -0,079* 0,031
25-60 months -0,024 0,037
Vocational training between 01/2000-12/2004 0,156*** 0,036
East Germany West Germany
Men Women Men Women
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Table 3 continued 
Probit estimates - probability of assignment to private placement services from February to April 
2005 for unemployment benefit II recipients registered as unemployed in January 2005 
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Regional labour market (district level)
Unemployment rate 01/2005 0,057*** 0,003 0,065*** 0,004 -0,037*** 0,004 -0,033*** 0,006
Percentage change local unempl. rate Jan. /2005/ Jan. 2004 -0,017*** 0,002 -0,011*** 0,002 -0,002 0,001
Share of long-term unemployment 01/2005 (in percent) -0,027*** 0,002 -0,031*** 0,002 -0,026*** 0,002 -0,016*** 0,002
Percentage change of long-term unempl. share Jan. 2005/ Jan. 2004 -0,026*** 0,001 -0,024*** 0,001 0,002 0,001 0,006*** 0,001
Vacancy-unemployment ratio 01/2005 11,104*** 1,596 -0,791** 0,272 -0,689 0,375
Percentage change vacancy-unempl. ratio Jan. 2005/ Jan. 2004 0,002*** 0,000 0,001*** 0,000 0,003*** 0,000 0,003*** 0,000
Missing in region 0,247 0,156 0,617*** 0,183 -1,468*** 0,105 -0,898*** 0,124
Type of regional labour market (district level) (reference: Cities: below average LMC, high share of long-term unemployed)
Cities in West Germany: average labour market condition (LMC), high 
GDP, large share of long-term unemployed 0,289*** 0,040 0,269*** 0,050
Rural areas in West Germany: very good LMC, low share of long-term 
unemployed 0,038 0,048 0,141* 0,062
Rural areas in East Germany: severe LMC, low GDP per head -0,237*** 0,019 -0,143*** 0,024
Mainly rural areas in East Germany: very severe LMC, low GDP per 
head, large share of long-term unemployed -0,292*** 0,035 -0,207*** 0,040
Cities in West Germany: above-average LMC, high GDP per head 0,524*** 0,043 0,517*** 0,055
Mainly urban areas in West Germany: average LMC, high share of 
long-term unemployed 0,334*** 0,034 0,362*** 0,044
Rural areas in West Germany: average LMC 0,036 0,040 0,139** 0,051
Mainly rural areas: below average LMC -0,258*** 0,037 -0,302*** 0,041 0,031 0,055 0,204** 0,068
Rural areas in West Germany: average LMC, high seasonal dynamics 0,022 0,050 0,215*** 0,061
Rural areas in West Germany: very good LMC, seasonal dynamics, 
very low share of long-term unemployed -0,061 0,054 0,050 0,069
Interaction terms with age of 25 and older and …
...Private employment subsidy 2/2000-01/2005 -0,062 0,074
...Job creation schemes 2/2000-01/2005 -0,086 0,059
...Start-up subsidy 2/2000-01/2005 -0,192 0,143
...Practical short-term training 2/2000-01/2005 0,100 0,054
...Classroom short-term training 2/2000-01/2005 -0,073 0,042
...Further vocational training 2/2000-01/2005 -0,038 0,048
…Other ALMP 2/2000-01/2005 0,143** 0,052
…4-6 months cumulated duration of unemployment 2/2004-1/2005 -0,201* 0,083 -0,285*** 0,076
…7-9 months cumulated duration of unemployment 2/2004-1/2005 -0,206** 0,077 -0,251*** 0,072
...10-12 months cumulated duration of unemployment 2/2004-1/2005 -0,244*** 0,072 -0,280*** 0,066
…1-12 months since end of last ALMP up to 01/2005 -0,106 0,054 -0,164** 0,050
...13-24 months since end of last ALMP up to 01/2005 0,061 0,067 0,077 0,086
…1-12 months minor employment 01/2000-12/2004 -0,069** 0,023 -0,034 0,019
...13-24 months minor employment 01/2000-12/2004 -0,029 0,030 -0,086** 0,033
...25-60 months minor employment 01/2000-12/2004 -0,050 0,030 -0,023 0,038
...Vocational training between 01/2000-12/2004 -0,130* 0,057
Constant -1,987*** 0,122 -2,448*** 0,149 -0,951*** 0,101 -1,551*** 0,118
Number of observations
Log-Likelihood
Pseudo R2
Level of significance 0.001***/0.01**/0.05*
Labour Market Conditions (LMC)/ Gross Domestic Product (GDP)/ General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE)/ Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP)
Source: IEB V5.01 and LHG V2.0, own calculations
0,085 0,076 0,089 0,087
-3.744,51 -2.939,53 -3.587,50 -2.016,26
63.082 52.360 96.814 70.570
East Germany West Germany
Men Women Men Women
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Table 4 
Match quality for men in East Germany 
treated controls bias treated controls bias
Age in years (reference: 15-24)
25-29 0,104 0,117 0,022 -4,000 0,116 0,111 0,554 1,500
30-34 0,111 0,110 0,777 0,500 0,122 0,120 0,818 0,600
35-39 0,124 0,142 0,003 -5,300 0,137 0,138 0,856 -0,500
40-44 0,137 0,176 0,000 -10,500 0,153 0,160 0,449 -1,900
45-49 0,106 0,154 0,000 -14,300 0,119 0,113 0,434 1,900
50-57 0,103 0,202 0,000 -27,900 0,116 0,133 0,034 -4,900
With migration background 0,135 0,080 0,000 17,900 0,133 0,132 0,912 0,300
Impairmant of health or disabled 0,088 0,147 0,000 -18,300 0,097 0,096 0,933 0,200
Education (reference: Secondary school, vocational education)
No secondary schooling degree and no vocational education 0,142 0,129 0,028 3,700 0,148 0,151 0,700 -1,000
Secondary school, no vocational education 0,153 0,118 0,000 10,300 0,147 0,157 0,250 -3,000
GCSE or A-level, no vocational education 0,084 0,056 0,000 10,900 0,080 0,083 0,715 -1,000
GCSE, vocational education 0,298 0,350 0,000 -11,000 0,301 0,296 0,682 1,000
A-level, vocational training or college 0,042 0,055 0,001 -6,000 0,046 0,046 1,000 0,000
Household context (reference: no partner, no children )
Children, no child younger than six years 0,092 0,119 0,000 -8,600 0,101 0,092 0,235 2,900
Children younger than six years 0,073 0,063 0,020 3,900 0,075 0,072 0,667 1,100
Married or unmarried partner in household 0,235 0,309 0,000 -16,700 0,249 0,236 0,220 3,000
Partner in houshold with vocational education 0,107 0,200 0,000 -26,200 0,117 0,107 0,204 2,800
Partners more than 12 months regular employed 01/2000-12/2005 0,044 0,073 0,000 -12,800 0,048 0,047 0,906 0,300
Cumulated duration of unemployment 02/2004-01/2005 (reference: 1-3 months)
4-6 months 0,085 0,085 0,859 0,300 0,087 0,083 0,559 1,500
7-9 months 0,170 0,146 0,000 6,700 0,166 0,159 0,456 1,900
10-12 months 0,702 0,695 0,385 1,500 0,701 0,713 0,296 -2,600
Unemployment benefit recipient in 12/2004 0,781 0,769 0,110 2,800 0,781 0,783 0,904 -0,300
ALMP participation during 02/2000-01/2005 (reference: no ALMP)
Private employment subsidy 0,094 0,102 0,104 -2,800 0,096 0,085 0,117 3,800
Job creation scheme 0,250 0,276 0,001 -6,000 0,259 0,253 0,567 1,400
Start-up subsidy 0,021 0,025 0,080 -3,100 0,021 0,021 0,930 0,200
Practical short-term training 0,097 0,101 0,451 -1,300 0,098 0,093 0,495 1,700
Classroom short-term training 0,393 0,316 0,000 16,100 0,375 0,380 0,642 -1,200
Further vocational training 0,269 0,249 0,009 4,400 0,263 0,264 0,955 -0,100
Other ALMP 0,157 0,144 0,041 3,500 0,144 0,139 0,542 1,500
Cumulated duration out of labour force 02/2004-01/2005 (reference: 0 months)
1-6 months 0,167 0,153 0,026 3,800 0,161 0,163 0,760 -0,800
7-11 months 0,040 0,039 0,917 0,200 0,040 0,046 0,295 -2,700
12 months 0,011 0,030 0,000 -13,400 0,013 0,011 0,561 1,100
Cumulated duration out of labour force 02/2000-01/2004 (reference: 0 months)
1-6 months 0,249 0,288 0,000 -8,800 0,259 0,256 0,797 0,600
7-12 months 0,147 0,099 0,000 14,600 0,128 0,125 0,707 1,000
13-18 months 0,053 0,044 0,018 3,900 0,049 0,050 0,818 -0,600
19-24 months 0,048 0,035 0,000 6,500 0,044 0,041 0,576 1,400
25-30 months 0,031 0,026 0,052 3,200 0,028 0,035 0,116 -4,200
31-36 months 0,030 0,024 0,022 3,700 0,027 0,026 0,756 0,800
37-42 months 0,026 0,022 0,169 2,300 0,026 0,024 0,631 1,200
43-48 months 0,053 0,058 0,212 -2,200 0,054 0,058 0,549 -1,500
Cumulated duration of minor employment 01/2000-12/2004 (reference: 0 months)
1-12 months 0,243 0,240 0,627 0,800 0,241 0,218 0,032 5,300
13-24 months 0,052 0,064 0,004 -5,100 0,055 0,054 0,869 0,400
25-60 months 0,034 0,040 0,078 -3,100 0,036 0,036 0,946 0,200
Regional labour market (district level)
Unemployment rate 01/2005 23,645 22,996 0,000 17,100 23,473 23,425 0,611 1,300
Percentage change local unempl. rate Jan. /2005/ Jan. 2004 8,526 8,368 0,037 3,900 8,501 8,583 0,396 -2,000
Share of long-term unemployment 01/2005 (in percent) 39,734 40,069 0,000 -7,600 39,644 39,534 0,302 2,500
Percentage change of long-term unempl. share Jan. 2005/ Jan. 2004 -5,087 -2,801 0,000 -41,300 -4,914 -5,103 0,127 3,400
Percentage change vacancy-unempl. ratio Jan. 2005/ Jan. 2004 -6,634 -11,006 0,000 11,000 -8,135 -8,154 0,984 0,000
Missing in region 0,003 0,003 0,691 0,700 0,003 0,003 0,827 -0,600
Type of regional labour market (district level) (reference: Cities: below average LMC, high share of long-term unemployed)
Rural areas in East Germany: severe LMC, low GDP per head 0,229 0,307 0,000 -17,700 0,231 0,225 0,571 1,300
Mainly rural areas in East Germany: very severe LMC, low GDP per 
head, large share of long-term unemployed 0,177 0,169 0,174 2,300 0,167 0,157 0,277 2,600
Mainly rural areas: below average LMC 0,044 0,090 0,000 -18,400 0,049 0,043 0,309 2,100
…4-6 months cumulated duration of unemployment 2/2004-1/2005 0,034 0,065 0,000 -14,300 0,039 0,037 0,693 0,900
…7-9 months cumulated duration of unemployment 2/2004-1/2005 0,088 0,123 0,000 -11,300 0,099 0,099 0,933 0,200
...10-12 months cumulated duration of unemployment 2/2004-1/2005 0,543 0,659 0,000 -23,800 0,603 0,619 0,191 -3,300
Labour Market Conditions (LMC)/ Gross Domestic Product (GDP)/ General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE)/ Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP)
before matching after matching
p-value 
of t-test
mean meanp-value 
of t-test
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Table 5 
Match quality for women in East Germany 
treated controls bias treated controls bias
Age in years (reference: 15-24)
25-29 0,098 0,100 0,646 -0,900 0,107 0,118 0,223 -3,700
30-34 0,127 0,115 0,069 3,500 0,133 0,141 0,362 -2,700
35-39 0,139 0,153 0,051 -3,900 0,155 0,159 0,724 -1,000
40-44 0,159 0,179 0,008 -5,300 0,177 0,169 0,429 2,300
45-49 0,104 0,154 0,000 -15,000 0,117 0,117 0,965 0,100
50-57 0,095 0,197 0,000 -29,300 0,107 0,113 0,494 -1,700
With migration background 0,122 0,090 0,000 10,200 0,120 0,123 0,794 -0,800
Impairmant of health or disabled 0,065 0,099 0,000 -12,500 0,070 0,065 0,497 1,800
Education (reference: Secondary school, vocational education)
No secondary schooling degree and no vocational education 0,128 0,134 0,422 -1,600 0,135 0,137 0,835 -0,600
Secondary school, no vocational education 0,136 0,112 0,000 7,300 0,131 0,130 0,933 0,200
GCSE or A-level, no vocational education 0,085 0,073 0,017 4,500 0,088 0,086 0,800 0,800
GCSE, vocational education 0,407 0,426 0,051 -3,800 0,403 0,411 0,581 -1,600
A-level, vocational training or college 0,051 0,057 0,167 -2,800 0,054 0,053 0,949 0,200
Looking only for a part-time job 0,085 0,066 0,000 7,200 0,088 0,089 0,960 -0,200
Household context (reference: no partner, no children )
Children, no child younger than six years 0,294 0,308 0,133 -2,900 0,320 0,319 0,927 0,300
Children younger than six years 0,147 0,146 0,874 0,300 0,143 0,145 0,839 -0,600
Married or unmarried partner in household 0,310 0,375 0,000 -13,800 0,321 0,320 0,903 0,300
Cumulated duration of unemployment 02/2004-01/2005 (reference: 1-3 months)
4-6 months 0,108 0,077 0,000 11,000 0,096 0,094 0,846 0,600
7-9 months 0,153 0,121 0,000 9,300 0,141 0,148 0,465 -2,100
10-12 months 0,668 0,688 0,032 -4,200 0,687 0,684 0,830 0,600
Unemployment benefit recipient in 12/2004 0,698 0,706 0,348 -1,800 0,704 0,698 0,597 1,500
ALMP participation during 02/2000-01/2005 (reference: no ALMP)
Private employment subsidy 0,070 0,077 0,141 -2,900 0,069 0,070 0,911 -0,300
Job creation scheme 0,261 0,256 0,546 1,200 0,266 0,254 0,314 2,900
Start-up subsidy 0,013 0,014 0,521 -1,300 0,012 0,012 1,000 0,000
Practical short-term training 0,090 0,073 0,001 6,200 0,078 0,083 0,530 -1,800
Classroom short-term training 0,397 0,338 0,000 12,400 0,380 0,384 0,769 -0,800
Further vocational training 0,247 0,248 0,888 -0,300 0,246 0,237 0,424 2,300
Other ALMP 0,157 0,143 0,034 4,100 0,144 0,139 0,624 1,400
Cumulated duration out of labour force 02/2004-01/2005 (reference: 0 months)
1-6 months 0,129 0,116 0,033 4,100 0,126 0,120 0,573 1,600
7-11 months 0,055 0,050 0,280 2,100 0,054 0,059 0,537 -1,800
12 months 0,027 0,060 0,000 -16,100 0,031 0,027 0,395 2,000
Regional labour market (district level)
Unemployment rate 01/2005 23,734 23,019 0,000 18,500 23,589 23,638 0,658 -1,300
Percentage change local unempl. rate Jan. /2005/ Jan. 2004 8,746 8,341 0,000 10,000 8,744 8,630 0,300 2,800
Share of long-term unemployment 01/2005 (in percent) 39,678 40,141 0,000 -10,000 39,610 39,655 0,729 -1,000
Percentage change of long-term unempl. share Jan. 2005/ Jan. 2004 -4,708 -2,694 0,000 -36,000 -4,627 -4,720 0,526 1,700
Vacancy-unemployment ratio 01/2005 0,014 0,013 0,000 10,700 0,014 0,014 0,546 -1,600
Percentage change vacancy-unempl. ratio Jan. 2005/ Jan. 2004 -5,720 -10,836 0,000 12,600 -8,052 -5,814 0,054 -5,500
Missing in region 0,005 0,004 0,309 1,900 0,004 0,004 0,654 1,300
Type of regional labour market (district level) (reference: Cities: below average LMC, high share of long-term unemployed)
Rural areas in East Germany: severe LMC, low GDP per head 0,250 0,312 0,000 -13,700 0,246 0,245 0,921 0,300
Mainly rural areas in East Germany: very severe LMC, low GDP per 
head, large share of long-term unemployed 0,190 0,173 0,022 4,400 0,177 0,177 1,000 0,000
Mainly rural areas: below average LMC 0,043 0,090 0,000 -18,600 0,042 0,034 0,157 3,100
Labour Market Conditions (LMC)/ Gross Domestic Product (GDP)/ General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE)/ Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP)
before matching after matching
p-value 
of t-test
mean meanp-value 
of t-test
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Table 6 
Match quality for men in West Germany 
treated controls bias treated controls bias
Age in years (reference: 15-24)
25-29 0,114 0,113 0,830 0,400 0,121 0,124 0,778 -0,800
30-34 0,110 0,124 0,019 -4,300 0,119 0,122 0,745 -0,900
35-39 0,143 0,156 0,041 -3,700 0,153 0,152 0,854 0,500
40-44 0,125 0,166 0,000 -11,700 0,138 0,133 0,588 1,400
45-49 0,160 0,147 0,052 3,400 0,169 0,163 0,499 1,800
50-57 0,118 0,195 0,000 -21,200 0,131 0,130 0,906 0,300
With migration background 0,216 0,243 0,000 -6,400 0,225 0,222 0,799 0,700
Impairmant of health or disabled 0,126 0,181 0,000 -15,300 0,137 0,129 0,391 2,100
Education (reference: Secondary school, vocational education)
No secondary schooling degree and no vocational education 0,158 0,217 0,000 -15,000 0,166 0,169 0,777 -0,700
Secondary school, no vocational education 0,266 0,268 0,763 -0,500 0,269 0,278 0,423 -2,100
GCSE or A-level, no vocational education 0,048 0,059 0,013 -4,700 0,051 0,055 0,554 -1,600
GCSE, vocational education 0,110 0,085 0,000 8,600 0,105 0,099 0,431 2,100
A-level, vocational training or college 0,082 0,072 0,029 3,800 0,084 0,079 0,468 2,000
Household context (reference: no partner, no children )
Children, no child younger than six years 0,106 0,106 0,966 0,100 0,112 0,105 0,372 2,400
Children younger than six years 0,092 0,083 0,052 3,400 0,093 0,088 0,460 2,000
Married or unmarried partner in household 0,271 0,274 0,770 -0,500 0,281 0,263 0,122 4,100
Partner participated in ALMP 01/2000-01/2005 0,076 0,089 0,010 -4,800 0,080 0,078 0,844 0,500
Unemployment benefit recipient in 12/2004 0,818 0,731 0,000 20,800 0,808 0,814 0,543 -1,500
ALMP participation during 02/2000-01/2005 (reference: no ALMP)
Private employment subsidy 0,075 0,071 0,390 1,500 0,075 0,074 0,920 0,300
Job creation scheme 0,089 0,079 0,026 3,900 0,080 0,083 0,628 -1,300
Start-up subsidy 0,034 0,033 0,838 0,400 0,034 0,030 0,411 2,100
Practical short-term training 0,136 0,090 0,000 14,700 0,129 0,130 0,937 -0,200
Classroom short-term training 0,392 0,322 0,000 14,700 0,376 0,389 0,288 -2,900
Further vocational training 0,263 0,208 0,000 12,900 0,258 0,265 0,567 -1,600
Other ALMP 0,197 0,189 0,256 2,000 0,200 0,219 0,091 -4,600
Duration since end of last ALMP 01/2000-01/2005 (reference: 25 months and longer or no ALMP)
1-12 months 0,364 0,284 0,000 17,000 0,336 0,358 0,075 -4,800
13-24 months 0,137 0,125 0,043 3,600 0,141 0,137 0,674 1,100
Cumulated duration out of labour force 02/2004-01/2005 (reference: 0 months)
1-6 months 0,165 0,182 0,013 -4,600 0,162 0,162 1,000 0,000
7-11 months 0,043 0,060 0,000 -7,400 0,047 0,045 0,705 1,000
12 months 0,018 0,057 0,000 -20,700 0,020 0,022 0,580 -1,100
Cumulated duration out of labour force 02/2000-01/2004 (reference: 0 months)
1-6 months 0,333 0,333 0,948 0,100 0,337 0,349 0,316 -2,700
7-12 months 0,129 0,107 0,000 6,800 0,116 0,117 0,869 -0,400
13-18 months 0,067 0,062 0,252 2,000 0,067 0,064 0,748 0,900
19-24 months 0,055 0,045 0,007 4,600 0,052 0,051 0,857 0,500
25-30 months 0,031 0,034 0,364 -1,700 0,030 0,029 0,754 0,800
31-36 months 0,028 0,031 0,327 -1,800 0,028 0,024 0,281 2,700
37-42 months 0,023 0,028 0,057 -3,600 0,023 0,027 0,308 -2,700
43-48 months 0,046 0,090 0,000 -17,300 0,051 0,046 0,354 2,100
Time since end of last contributory job (reference: more than 48 months [14 years] or none contributory job)
1-12 months 0,216 0,177 0,000 9,800 0,201 0,214 0,203 -3,400
13-24 months 0,201 0,171 0,000 7,500 0,195 0,201 0,573 -1,500
25-48 months 0,296 0,264 0,000 7,200 0,307 0,301 0,645 1,200
Last monthly real wage (reference: None contributory job for at least 14 years)
1-400 Euro 0,036 0,033 0,425 1,400 0,036 0,038 0,726 -1,000
401-800 Euro 0,071 0,073 0,654 -0,800 0,067 0,071 0,530 -1,600
801-1200 Euro 0,171 0,142 0,000 8,100 0,162 0,164 0,858 -0,500
1201-1600 Euro 0,188 0,202 0,054 -3,500 0,189 0,190 0,946 -0,200
1601-2000 Euro 0,179 0,169 0,151 2,600 0,182 0,184 0,811 -0,600
2001 Euro and more 0,227 0,199 0,000 6,800 0,238 0,236 0,828 0,600
missing in real wage 0,027 0,048 0,000 -10,800 0,030 0,027 0,524 1,500
Regional labour market (district level)
Unemployment rate 01/2005 11,396 13,206 0,000 -51,100 11,428 11,303 0,131 3,500
Percentage change local unempl. rate Jan. /2005/ Jan. 2004 12,808 15,364 0,000 -20,500 12,709 12,735 0,934 -0,200
Share of long-term unemployment 01/2005 (in percent) 30,783 33,552 0,000 -37,100 30,918 30,753 0,384 2,200
Percentage change of long-term unempl. share Jan. 2005/ Jan. 2004 2,000 -0,449 0,000 27,200 1,889 1,905 0,947 -0,200
Vacancy-unemployment ratio 01/2005 0,044 0,036 0,000 34,000 0,043 0,044 0,406 -2,400
Percentage change vacancy-unempl. ratio Jan. 2005/ Jan. 2004 2,288 -8,646 0,000 27,800 0,156 -0,141 0,772 0,800
Missing in region 0,008 0,010 0,262 -2,100 0,009 0,013 0,157 -4,100
before matching after matching
p-value of 
t-test
mean meanp-value of 
t-test
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Table 6 continued 
Match quality for men in West Germany 
treated controls bias treated controls bias
Type of regional labour market (district level) (reference: Cities: below average LMC, high share of long-term unemployed)
Cities in West Germany: average labour market condition (LMC), high 
GDP, large share of long-term unemployed 0,233 0,174 0,000 14,800 0,240 0,244 0,757 -0,900
Rural areas in West Germany: very good LMC, low share of long-term 0,121 0,081 0,000 13,300 0,116 0,128 0,157 -4,100
Cities in West Germany: above-average LMC, high GDP per head 0,140 0,050 0,000 31,200 0,123 0,111 0,175 4,000
Mainly urban areas in West Germany: average LMC, high share of 
long-term unemployed 0,160 0,173 0,069 -3,300 0,170 0,166 0,723 0,900
Rural areas in West Germany: average LMC 0,151 0,189 0,000 -9,900 0,155 0,154 0,913 0,300
Mainly rural areas: below average LMC 0,024 0,037 0,000 -7,700 0,026 0,025 0,736 0,800
Rural areas in West Germany: average LMC, high seasonal dynamics 0,061 0,050 0,007 4,700 0,056 0,063 0,265 -3,100
Rural areas in West Germany: very good LMC, seasonal dynamics, 
very low share of long-term unemployed 0,073 0,043 0,000 13,100 0,073 0,074 0,879 -0,400
Interaction terms with age of 25 and older and …
...Private employment subsidy 2/2000-01/2005 0,058 0,067 0,064 -3,400 0,064 0,063 0,914 0,300
...Job creation schemes 2/2000-01/2005 0,055 0,067 0,011 -4,700 0,059 0,060 0,955 -0,100
...Start-up subsidy 2/2000-01/2005 0,030 0,033 0,366 -1,700 0,033 0,030 0,494 1,800
...Practical short-term training 2/2000-01/2005 0,097 0,078 0,000 6,800 0,101 0,102 0,930 -0,200
...Classroom short-term training 2/2000-01/2005 0,285 0,291 0,420 -1,500 0,310 0,315 0,648 -1,200
...Further vocational training 2/2000-01/2005 0,216 0,196 0,004 5,100 0,228 0,234 0,616 -1,400
…Other ALMP 2/2000-01/2005 0,159 0,172 0,059 -3,400 0,170 0,181 0,281 -2,900
…1-12 months since end of last ALMP up to 01/2005 0,239 0,246 0,368 -1,600 0,258 0,268 0,383 -2,400
...13-24 months since end of last ALMP up to 01/2005 0,113 0,115 0,674 -0,800 0,122 0,118 0,684 1,100
…1-12 months minor employment 01/2000-12/2004 0,168 0,196 0,000 -7,300 0,181 0,177 0,629 1,300
...13-24 months minor employment 01/2000-12/2004 0,043 0,060 0,000 -7,400 0,048 0,046 0,755 0,800
...25-60 months minor employment 01/2000-12/2004 0,032 0,040 0,034 -4,000 0,036 0,033 0,561 1,500
...Vocational training between 01/2000-12/2004 0,027 0,024 0,290 1,900 0,028 0,024 0,321 2,700
Labour Market Conditions (LMC)/ Gross Domestic Product (GDP)/ General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE)/ Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP)
mean p-value of 
t-test
before matching after matching
mean p-value of 
t-test
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Table 7 
Match quality for women in West Germany 
treated controls bias treated controls bias
Age in years (reference: 15-24)
25-29 0,098 0,114 0,046 -5,000 0,103 0,110 0,557 -2,100
30-34 0,118 0,134 0,050 -4,900 0,127 0,124 0,827 0,800
35-39 0,140 0,161 0,023 -5,700 0,149 0,150 0,919 -0,400
40-44 0,132 0,165 0,000 -9,400 0,144 0,157 0,311 -3,700
45-49 0,144 0,133 0,164 3,300 0,155 0,159 0,804 -0,900
50-57 0,123 0,178 0,000 -15,300 0,138 0,130 0,559 2,000
With migration background 0,179 0,252 0,000 -17,600 0,193 0,182 0,404 2,900
Impairmant of health or disabled 0,082 0,116 0,000 -11,500 0,086 0,084 0,846 0,700
Education (reference: Secondary school, vocational education)
No secondary schooling degree and no vocational education 0,144 0,272 0,000 -31,700 0,153 0,153 0,960 -0,200
Secondary school, no vocational education 0,255 0,272 0,103 -4,000 0,264 0,279 0,371 -3,300
GCSE or A-level, no vocational education 0,089 0,073 0,017 5,600 0,086 0,092 0,525 -2,400
GCSE, vocational education 0,177 0,112 0,000 18,500 0,166 0,150 0,214 4,700
A-level, vocational training or college 0,075 0,074 0,890 0,300 0,079 0,075 0,635 1,700
Household context (reference: no partner, no children )
Children, no child younger than six years 0,243 0,291 0,000 -10,900 0,264 0,268 0,838 -0,700
Children younger than six years 0,099 0,178 0,000 -23,000 0,107 0,109 0,861 -0,600
Married or unmarried partner in household 0,222 0,311 0,000 -20,200 0,231 0,224 0,635 1,600
Partner participated in ALMP 01/2000-01/2005 0,124 0,188 0,000 -17,600 0,130 0,121 0,413 2,700
Partners more than 12 months out of labour force 01/2000-12/2004 0,075 0,112 0,000 -12,600 0,080 0,070 0,303 3,400
Cumulated duration of unemployment 02/2004-01/2005 (reference: 1-3 months)
4-6 months 0,102 0,088 0,043 4,800 0,098 0,092 0,578 2,000
7-9 months 0,137 0,102 0,000 10,900 0,125 0,123 0,826 0,800
10-12 months 0,630 0,491 0,000 28,400 0,632 0,649 0,327 -3,500
Unemployment benefit recipient in 12/2004 0,681 0,468 0,000 44,100 0,662 0,681 0,264 -3,900
Duration since end of last ALMP 01/2000-01/2005 (reference: 25 months and longer or no ALMP)
1-12 months 0,331 0,222 0,000 24,600 0,300 0,306 0,694 -1,500
13-24 months 0,140 0,094 0,000 14,400 0,138 0,144 0,677 -1,600
Cumulated duration out of labour force 02/2004-01/2005 (reference: 0 months)
1-6 months 0,145 0,158 0,158 -3,500 0,150 0,153 0,801 -0,900
7-11 months 0,070 0,094 0,001 -8,500 0,074 0,060 0,129 5,000
12 months 0,050 0,190 0,000 -44,200 0,056 0,060 0,643 -1,200
Time since end of last contributory job (reference: more than 48 months [14 years] or none contributory job)
1-12 months 0,189 0,155 0,000 8,900 0,178 0,176 0,850 0,700
13-24 months 0,201 0,137 0,000 17,100 0,197 0,204 0,651 -1,800
25-48 months 0,253 0,191 0,000 14,800 0,258 0,260 0,934 -0,300
49 months - 14 years 0,171 0,207 0,000 -9,200 0,186 0,186 1,000 0,000
Regional labour market (district level)
Unemployment rate 01/2005 11,280 13,226 0,000 -53,200 11,351 11,355 0,972 -0,100
Share of long-term unemployment 01/2005 (in percent) 30,658 32,654 0,000 -26,000 30,754 30,842 0,745 -1,100
Percentage change of long-term unempl. share Jan. 2005/ Jan. 2004 2,336 -1,337 0,000 39,700 2,075 2,131 0,859 -0,600
Vacancy-unemployment ratio 01/2005 0,044 0,036 0,000 29,600 0,043 0,043 0,482 -2,600
Percentage change vacancy-unempl. ratio Jan. 2005/ Jan. 2004 0,773 -10,074 0,000 29,200 -1,822 -0,074 0,176 -4,700
Missing in region 0,012 0,009 0,341 2,200 0,013 0,013 1,000 0,000
Type of regional labour market (district level) (reference: Cities: below average LMC, high share of long-term unemployed)
Cities in West Germany: average labour market condition (LMC), high 
GDP, large share of long-term unemployed 0,198 0,178 0,029 5,200 0,207 0,233 0,080 -6,700
Rural areas in West Germany: very good LMC, low share of long-term 
unemployed 0,147 0,090 0,000 17,700 0,144 0,142 0,918 0,400
Cities in West Germany: above-average LMC, high GDP per head 0,135 0,051 0,000 29,100 0,117 0,111 0,649 1,800
Mainly urban areas in West Germany: average LMC, high share of 
long-term unemployed 0,154 0,172 0,056 -4,800 0,165 0,153 0,373 3,200
Rural areas in West Germany: average LMC 0,152 0,171 0,041 -5,100 0,153 0,156 0,841 -0,700
Mainly rural areas: below average LMC 0,025 0,037 0,010 -6,900 0,024 0,024 0,906 0,400
Rural areas in West Germany: average LMC, high seasonal dynamics 0,073 0,058 0,011 5,900 0,073 0,067 0,479 2,700
Rural areas in West Germany: very good LMC, seasonal dynamics, 
very low share of long-term unemployed 0,077 0,052 0,000 10,200 0,073 0,075 0,890 -0,500
Labour Market Conditions (LMC)/ Gross Domestic Product (GDP)/ General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE)/ Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP)
before matching after matching
p-value of 
t-test
mean meanp-value of 
t-test
 
 
 
IAB-Discussion Paper 5/2008 33 
Figure 1 
Men in East Germany: average treatment effects on the treated (in percentage points), radius matching with caliper 0.001 
3599 treated / 59471 controls
Mean bias before matching: 9.1
Mean bias after matching: .4
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Figure 2 
Women in East Germany: average treatment effects on the treated (in percentage points), radius matching with caliper 0.001 
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calculations
Note: Unemployment benefit II recipients, treated assigned to private placement services between February and April 2005
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Figure 3 
Men in West Germany: average treatment effects on the treated (in percentage points), radius matching with caliper 0.001 
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Source: IEB V5.01 and V6.01, LHG V2.0 and V3.0, data marts of the Statistics Department of the Federal Employment Agency, own 
calculations
Note: Unemployment benefit II recipients, treated assigned to private placement services between February and April 2005
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Figure 4 
Women in West Germany: average treatment effects on the treated (in percentage points), radius matching with caliper 0.001 
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Source: IEB V5.01 and V6.01, LHG V2.0 and V3.0, data marts of the Statistics Department of the Federal Employment Agency, own 
calculations
Note: Unemployment benefit II recipients, treated assigned to private placement services between February and April 2005
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